March 4, 2025
CMMC can feel overwhelming because it combines contractual requirements, cybersecurity controls, detailed documentation, technical implementation, assessment evidence, scoping, and ongoing program management. In this Hotman Group session, Cheri Hotman and Paula break down what organizations should understand before pursuing CMMC, why there is no compliance “easy button,” and how defense contractors can approach CMMC as part of a sustainable cybersecurity program rather than a one-time certification project.
Cheri and Paula discuss common CMMC misconceptions, NIST SP 800-171, CMMC levels, scoping, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), System Security Plans, evidence, remediation, assessment readiness, cost and ROI, shared responsibility, GRC technology, continuous monitoring, and how CMMC should fit into a broader cybersecurity and compliance program.
This session was recorded in March 2025. CMMC implementation details have continued to evolve since the recording. Organizations should verify current assessment, contractual, and implementation requirements against their solicitation or contract and current official CMMC guidance rather than relying on an older rollout schedule.
CMMC is not simply paperwork and it is not a certification an organization should pursue by buying a tool, downloading a policy package, or rushing through a checklist.
CMMC is designed to provide assurance that organizations handling certain federal information have implemented the cybersecurity practices required for that environment.
Successful CMMC readiness therefore requires understanding contractual requirements, defining the correct scope, identifying where sensitive information lives and flows, assessing existing controls, remediating gaps, documenting how processes actually operate, collecting appropriate evidence, preparing the people involved in those processes, and continuing to operate the program after the assessment is complete.
The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, or CMMC, is designed to provide greater assurance that organizations in the defense industrial base are implementing required cybersecurity practices for protecting federal information.
The program addresses two important information types:
The required CMMC level and assessment approach depend on the information involved and the requirements associated with the applicable defense contract or solicitation.
No — and treating it that way undermines much of the value of the program.
As Paula explains in the session, CMMC requirements represent baseline security practices organizations should be considering to protect networks, information, and business operations — not merely government data.
Cheri makes the same distinction she frequently makes across compliance frameworks: cybersecurity and compliance are different disciplines, but the intent behind security compliance is still to create better protection.
The problem begins when organizations shortcut the security work in order to get through the compliance requirement.
That is the same reason passing a cybersecurity audit does not automatically mean the organization is secure.
No.
Small and midsize organizations can also become part of the defense supply chain and may receive CMMC-related requirements through contracts and subcontract relationships.
That is one reason CMMC can be particularly challenging for smaller businesses. The cybersecurity expectations can be substantial even when the organization itself is relatively small.
The program therefore needs to be approached strategically: understand the contractual requirement, determine what information the organization will handle, define the appropriate scope, and understand what maintaining that environment will require.
No.
Tools can make CMMC work more efficient, but no single platform can perform every responsibility required to operate the program.
CMMC involves areas such as:
A tool may support many of those activities, but someone still has to design, implement, operate, document, monitor, and improve the processes around it.
If CMMC is required for the applicable work, another framework does not automatically replace it.
The good news is that existing cybersecurity and compliance programs can provide a significant foundation.
Many frameworks address similar domains such as access control, risk, incident response, asset management, security awareness, configuration, vulnerability management, and governance.
The better approach is not to run CMMC in a separate silo. Organizations should identify where existing controls satisfy overlapping requirements, determine where CMMC requires additional specificity, and integrate those requirements into one broader Cyber GRC operating model.
They are closely connected, but they should not be treated as identical concepts.
CMMC Level 2 is built around the 110 security requirements in NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2.
Where organizations often become surprised is the level of evidence and assessment detail needed to demonstrate that those requirements are actually implemented.
A high-level statement that “we do access control,” “we manage configurations,” or “we perform risk assessments” is not enough. The organization needs to understand the detailed practices underneath the requirement and be able to demonstrate how they operate.
Level 1 focuses on basic safeguarding of Federal Contract Information and uses an annual self-assessment and affirmation model.
Level 2 focuses on broader protection of Controlled Unclassified Information and aligns with the 110 security requirements in NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2. Depending on the applicable requirement, the assessment may be a self-assessment or an independent C3PAO assessment.
Level 3 addresses higher-level protection of CUI against more advanced threats and involves government assessment. Organizations should pursue the level required for their business and contractual environment rather than assuming a higher level is automatically better.
Not simply for the sake of being an overachiever.
The appropriate level should connect to the organization's contractual requirements and business strategy.
Moving into a more demanding maturity level can require additional investment, controls, technical capabilities, documentation, people, and ongoing operating effort.
A certification level by itself does not create revenue. The organization still needs a realistic market and contracting strategy that justifies the investment.
Not necessarily.
One of the strongest points in the session is that organizations should evaluate the business case before committing significant resources to a CMMC environment.
The calculation should consider more than the assessment itself.
Potential costs include:
If the revenue opportunity connected to defense work does not justify that investment, leadership should understand that before committing to the program.
There is no universal timeline.
An organization with a mature security program, strong documentation, clear CUI boundaries, established policies, and well-operated controls will have a very different readiness effort from an organization beginning with little cybersecurity structure.
Readiness can require months of work and, for organizations beginning with significant technical and process gaps, potentially much longer.
The important lesson is to avoid waiting until a contract opportunity creates an emergency. Scoping, remediation, documentation, process implementation, training, evidence collection, and assessment preparation all require time.
At a high level, Cheri and Paula outline a practical progression:
Skipping the implementation step is particularly dangerous. Documentation that describes a process the organization does not actually perform can create a major problem during assessment.
Scoping determines which people, systems, devices, facilities, services, and other assets are part of the environment subject to the CMMC assessment.
That makes scoping one of the most important early decisions in the readiness process.
Organizations first need to understand:
An unnecessarily broad scope can substantially increase the number of systems, users, processes, and assets that need to meet the applicable CMMC requirements.
Not automatically.
Good cybersecurity practices may deserve to be applied broadly across the organization, but that is different from declaring every employee, device, application, and location part of the formal CMMC assessment boundary.
Good security can be enterprise-wide while the formal CMMC assessment scope remains intentionally defined.
The organization should understand its CUI environment and design the assessment boundary intentionally rather than defaulting to “everything is in scope.”
You cannot accurately define or protect an environment if you do not know what exists inside it.
Asset management means more than relying on a discovery tool to identify whatever happens to be connected to the network today.
A meaningful lifecycle may include:
That full lifecycle perspective is important because CMMC readiness depends on understanding what assets actually interact with or protect the scoped environment.
A CUI data flow diagram helps show where Controlled Unclassified Information enters the environment, where it travels, where it is processed, where it is stored, which systems interact with it, and where it leaves.
The purpose is not simply to create an impressive technical diagram.
The organization needs to demonstrate that it understands the information it is protecting and how that information moves through internal and external systems.
The System Security Plan, or SSP, is one of the central documents in a CMMC environment.
It describes the system environment and how the organization implements relevant security requirements.
But the SSP should not be treated as a document written once for an assessment and forgotten afterward.
It is a living representation of the environment. When systems, processes, responsibilities, boundaries, or security practices change, the documentation needs to remain aligned with reality.
Because an assessor can validate the implementation.
Organizations sometimes begin with generic policy packages, templates, or automated documentation and assume the written process is enough.
It is not.
If your documentation says you perform a process, you need to be able to demonstrate that you actually perform it.
Cheri describes the approach as “trust but verify.” The written control, procedure, or policy should tie to evidence showing what actually happens in the environment.
Evidence depends on the requirement being evaluated.
Examples may include:
Paula describes assessment evidence in terms of both adequacy and sufficiency: the evidence needs to demonstrate that the practice exists and that it is implemented to the extent required across the applicable environment.
Because cybersecurity processes are operated by people.
An organization may have strong documentation, but if the people responsible for a process do not understand their responsibilities or describe a completely different workflow, that can expose a gap between written policy and actual practice.
Assessment readiness therefore includes preparing control owners and relevant employees to understand the process they actually perform — not coaching them to memorize an answer that is disconnected from reality.
Cheri and Paula identify several recurring weaknesses:
The exact gaps vary by organization, but the recurring theme is the same: CMMC evaluates an operating security program, not simply a collection of documents.
Organizations do not need to turn every required security process into the most sophisticated program imaginable on day one.
A process needs to meet the applicable requirement and operate effectively for the organization.
From there, the organization can improve maturity over time.
For example, an incident-response process might begin with a clear and tested plan. Over time, the organization may add more detailed playbooks, automation, exercises, monitoring, metrics, and other capabilities as risk, budget, and business needs justify them.
Where an independent assessment is required, organizations should expect much more than submitting a few policies and receiving a certificate.
The assessment process can involve:
The readiness process should therefore prepare the organization to demonstrate its security program — not simply explain what it intends to do.
Where a C3PAO assessment applies, the assessment organization matters.
Paula recommends asking meaningful questions about how the assessor approaches cybersecurity and assessments rather than simply looking for whoever appears most likely to provide an easy result.
An assessment should provide credible assurance that the required practices are actually operating. Choosing an assessor solely because the process appears unusually lax defeats much of the purpose of independent validation.
Many organizations rely on managed service providers, cloud providers, security vendors, consultants, and other third parties to operate portions of the environment.
A shared responsibility matrix helps define who is responsible for what.
For example:
Outsourcing an activity does not automatically outsource accountability. Organizations need to understand what the third party does and what remains their responsibility.
Yes — when the tool supports the program rather than pretending to replace it.
An appropriate GRC platform may help organizations:
The same principle applies when organizations choose a GRC platform: the operating model and desired outcomes should drive the technology decision, not the other way around.
Running CMMC as a completely separate compliance program creates unnecessary duplication.
The organization may already have controls supporting SOC 2, ISO 27001, customer requirements, risk management, or other cybersecurity obligations.
Instead of creating a second version of access control, security awareness, incident response, risk management, asset management, and other processes solely for CMMC, organizations should identify the common control environment and layer framework-specific requirements onto it.
The goal is one cybersecurity program that satisfies multiple requirements — not a separate security program for every framework.
No.
The underlying cybersecurity practices need to remain in place after the readiness effort or assessment is complete.
That includes activities such as:
As Cheri puts it in the session, cybersecurity compliance is a program that has to be run. It is not something the organization completes once and puts back on the shelf.
Controls eventually fail, environments change, and documented processes can drift away from reality.
Continuous or recurring monitoring helps organizations discover those changes before the next assessment does.
That may include confirming:
The organization should expect the CMMC environment to change and build processes for keeping the program aligned with those changes.
CMMC is the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program used to provide assurance that defense contractors and subcontractors implement required cybersecurity practices for protecting Federal Contract Information and Controlled Unclassified Information.
CMMC requirements depend on the applicable defense contract or solicitation and the information involved. Contractors and subcontractors should evaluate their specific contractual requirements rather than assuming CMMC applies only to large prime contractors.
No. Small and midsize organizations can also be part of the defense industrial base and may receive cybersecurity requirements through direct contracts or subcontract relationships.
Software can support CMMC activities such as evidence management, monitoring, control mapping, workflow, and reporting, but it cannot replace the people, processes, physical safeguards, policies, risk management, training, governance, and operating practices required by the program.
CMMC Level 2 incorporates the 110 security requirements from NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2, but CMMC adds an assessment and affirmation structure for demonstrating implementation.
CMMC scoping identifies the people, systems, assets, facilities, services, and security resources that handle, process, store, transmit, or protect the federal information included in the applicable environment.
A System Security Plan describes the system environment and how applicable security requirements are implemented. It should remain aligned with the actual environment and be updated as the system and processes change.
No. Existing frameworks may provide substantial overlap and reusable controls, but CMMC has specific requirements and assessment expectations that still need to be evaluated.
It depends heavily on the organization's starting maturity, technical environment, CUI scope, documentation, existing controls, staffing, budget, and remediation needs. Organizations with significant gaps should expect readiness to require substantial planning and implementation rather than treating it as a last-minute exercise.
No. The security practices underlying CMMC must continue operating over time. Organizations need ongoing monitoring, documentation maintenance, training, remediation, risk management, and compliance activities after the initial readiness or assessment effort.
This article is based on the Hotman Group session CMMC Compliance: Cutting Through the Confusion, featuring Cheri Hotman and Paula.
The session addresses common misconceptions about CMMC and provides practical guidance on contractual requirements, CUI, NIST SP 800-171, scoping, readiness assessments, remediation, documentation, evidence, System Security Plans, assessment preparation, cost, ROI, GRC technology, and continuous monitoring.
Because CMMC implementation requirements continue to evolve, organizations should verify current contractual and assessment requirements before relying on historical rollout dates discussed in older CMMC resources.
Organizations often bring in Hotman Group when CMMC requirements are becoming real but the path from current-state cybersecurity to an assessment-ready, sustainable program is unclear. HG can help when:
Hotman Group helps organizations scope, assess, design, remediate, document, implement, prepare, and operate cybersecurity and GRC programs while connecting compliance requirements to actual security practices and business objectives.
Hotman Group is a cybersecurity and Cyber GRC professional-services firm that helps organizations diagnose, design, build, remediate, implement, operate and mature cybersecurity programs. HG provides hands-on vCISO and vGRC leadership, supports multi-framework environments, and helps organizations select and implement GRC technology while connecting cybersecurity decisions to business risk and strategy.
Hotman Group helps defense contractors approach CMMC as an operating cybersecurity and GRC program — including scoping, gap assessment, remediation, documentation, controls, evidence, ownership, monitoring, assessment preparation, and integration with other frameworks.
The objective is not simply to reach the assessment. It is to build a security program capable of demonstrating that required practices are operating because those practices are actually part of how the organization works.